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CONTEMPLATING BRAZILIAN FEDERALISM:

REFLECTIONS ON THE PROMISE OF LIBERTY

Bruce A. Antkowiak*
I.

INTRODUCTION

As someone for whom a trip "south" generally means an excursion across the West Virginia border, and as one whose next successfully articulated sentence in Portuguese would be his first, I
was surprised and honored to have been asked by Professor
Robert Barker to comment on the presentation made on Brazilian
Federalism by perhaps the nation's leading authority on the subject, Professor Keith S. Rosenn of the University of Miami. Reading Professor Rosenn's brilliant piece on Brazilian Federalism
humbled me even further since, while I am likely incapable of
great law review writing, I am at least one who knows it when he
sees it.

I thus approach the daunting task of commenting on Professor
Rosenn's article as I do. so many things in this lately acquired career as a law professor: I accept it as a chance to learn by reflecting on the insights of one wiser than myself.
Professor Rosenn's work on Brazilian federalism has the most
wonderful effect of holding up a mirror from which we may reflect
on our own concept of federalism and its ongoing importance in
the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. While issues of gay rights, free speech, and complexities of the right to
trial by jury consistently grab headlines in the popular media coverage of the Supreme Court, I have a growing sense that the next
ten years of Court opinions will most profoundly affect the contours of our understanding of the structural framework of our government particularly, but not exclusively, insofar as it relates to
federalism.
In a few critical respects, Professor Rosenn's analysis of Brazilian federalism allows us to draw a sharp contrast with our own at
a time when such contrasting, and the insights it may yield, are of
critical importance.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. Professor Antkowiak
thanks Professor Robert Barker for the invitation to participate in this forum and Sarah
Cottrill for her able research assistance in the preparation of this article.
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THE MIRROR OF THE BRAZILIAN MODEL

Brazilians have accepted federalism in an evidently practical effort to find a way to govern a nation of "enormous size and distinct
regions with quite different traditions."1 The heritage of Brazilian
federalism is one of reaction against the Portuguese Empire's centralized control of the nation. Still, it appears not to be a complete
rejection of the notion of centralization, perhaps paying homage
not only to the remnants of monarchial control but also to the
strong and ongoing influence of the Roman Catholic Church and to
2
its own highly centralized unitary structure.
The structure of Brazilian federalism is much more defined in
the body of its Constitution than our form of federalism is in ours.
Compared with the United States Constitution, the Brazilian
document is enormous, specifying in multiple passages the powers
of the central government as they are juxtaposed3 with those of the
other components of the Brazilian federal model.
Perhaps the most intriguing consequence of the depth, complexity, and specificity of the Brazilian Constitution is its effect on the
role of the Brazilian courts in enforcing the principles of federalism delineated there. As Professor Rosenn has noted,
the Brazilian judiciary has not really served as the ultimate
arbiter of the balance of power between the states and the national government. That balance has usually been determined by complex political negotiations among the executive,
the state governors, and the state's representatives in the na4
tional Congress.
The role of the Courts in Brazilian federalism is directed more
toward enforcing the equivalent of the Brazilian Supremacy
Clause, with local ordinances and statutes commonly struck down
when in conflict with federal legislation. But, as Professor Rosenn
points out, what is absent in Brazil is "case law invalidating fed-

5
eral legislation for invading powers reserved to the states."

Unlike the United States, there is no Brazilian equivalent of the
Eleventh Amendment to protect states' sovereign immunity, and
1. Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in Brazil, 43 DUQ. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2005)
(manuscript at 3, on file with The Duquesne Law Review).
2. Id. (manuscript at 3, 4).
3. Id. (manuscript at 8-11). The Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, as
amended through 1997, fills 211 pages in modest handbook form.
4. Id. (manuscript at 12).
5. Id. (manuscript at 13).
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there appears to be no faction of Brazilian Supreme Court Justices
"who have assumed the role of protecting states' rights from infringement by the federal legislation."6
In short, Brazilian federalism appears heavily weighted to creating a more efficient overall national government, one that can
effectively manage a huge land mass filled with culturally diverse
factions. Its goals are primarily those of political structure, insuring that national and local governments act in a synchronized
manner to avoid a cacophony of conflicting political standards
while avoiding a return to a monarchial system too geographically
and politically distant from its diverse populace.
Given these goals, the principles and practices of federalism in
Brazil are most logically left in the hands of those political actors
whose negotiations over the contours of the system may regularly
tweak it to achieve the political ends for which it was created.
Courts may provide a reminder that the federal power is to be
paid deference if the tweaking process fails, but the courts are not
parties in that negotiation.
The purpose of federalism thus dictates the nature of this part
of the judicial function. This principle is not only true in the great
nation of Brazil. The role our courts play is fundamentally dictated by our perception of what good federalism is supposed to
achieve for us. As I hope to show, that role is more than a hemisphere apart from the one played by the judicial branch of the
former crown jewel of the Portuguese empire.
So, our initial questions are as follows: Why did we adopt federalism? Is the Supreme Court's role as the principle enforcer of
those federalist principles consistent with that purpose? The answer to these questions is worth a moment's reflection. We first
need, however, to spend a minute understanding our brand of federalism and appreciating why we proclaim to love it so.
III. WHAT WE SEE IN THE BRAZILIAN MIRROR: WE DO
LOVE OUR FEDERALISM
We certainly think we had a great reason for settling on federalism as a governmental structure. We extol it. We revel in it. We
wear it as a dowager wears her heirloom broach, an act not only of
family pride, but a bold assertion that it does indeed enhance

6.

Rosenn, supra note 2 (manuscript at 14).
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whatever outfit we are gracing it with at the moment, even if outside observers seem to question our taste in accessories.
We see federalism as arising as part of the core act of genius of
the Constitutional scheme. Madison led the chorus of these cheers
in Federalist Paper No. 39. The Framers, he said, were not satisfied with simply adopting a republican form of government but
also sought a national government through a union (a consolidation) of the states, an act of "bold and radical innovation" that
required him to posit under what authority "this was undertaken. '7 The answer was simple but profound for an Enlightenthis innovation came from the people acting
ment thinker:
through their delegates in the states, making the establishment of
federalism itself not "a nationalbut a federal act."8 We acted federally, it seems, even before we were born.
We have perceived our "bold and radical innovation" as a form
of federalism unique unto itself, part of an American DNA.
In Younger v. Harris,9 Justice Black argued for federal restraint
from interference with state court prosecutions out of the notion of
comity, a notion predicated on fundamental federalist principles.1 0
He observed "that the National Government will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways," the essence of what he called
"Our Federalism."'" He conceived of "Our Federalism" as a system
in which there was a "sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in
ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities
of the States.' 2 The notion of "Our Federalism" was, he said, one
that occupied "a highly important place in our Nation's history
13
and its future" and deserved our dedicated efforts.
7. THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 183 (Michael Kammen ed., Penguin
Books 1986) [hereinafter "ORIGINSi.
8. Id. The Anti-federalists, in The Letters from the Federal Farmer,also praised this
federal notion as "the only one that can secure the freedom and happiness of this people."
Id. at 269.
9. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
10.

Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 45. Justice Scalia has expressed considerable nationalistic pride in our form
of federalism. In Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), in chastising Justice Breyer
for asking the court to consider the federal systems of the European union, Justice Scalia
found such Acomparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution,
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The Court took time in United States Terms Limits v. Thornton 14 to discuss many of the features of that brand of federalism
that we declare to be our own. Writing for the majority, Justice
Stevens declared the character of the government that the Framers conceived to be "revolutionary,"' 15 one that, unlike the one created under the Articles of Confederation, did not simply form an
alliance of otherwise autonomous state entities. Rather, the new
National Government was one that forged "a direct link between
16
the National Government and the people of the United States.'
Those who would serve as representatives to that national government owed their "primary allegiance not to the people of a
State, but to the people of the Nation."17 Those representatives
had specific duties to perform, duties the states could not usurp.' 8
In many ways, the two governments were free standing entities,
with the space between them intentionally left a tense battleground.
In concurrence, Justice Kennedy was poetic about the nature of
the national government and its origins in the doctrine of federalism. He stated,
Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers
split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea
that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state
and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.
The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity,
its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who
sustain it and are governed by it. It is appropriate to recall
these origins, which instruct us as to the nature of the two different governments created and confirmed by the Constitution. 19

though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one.@ Printz,521 U.S. at 921,
n 11. In the final analysis, he concluded, Aour federalism is not Europe=s,@ it is rather
uniquely our own. Id.

14. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
15. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 803.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 806.
19. Id. at 838-39 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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Each government looked to the people as the common source of
their legitimacy. They were admonished by their common source,
however, to respect their respective spheres of authority:
That the states may not invade the sphere of federal sovereignty
is as incontestable, in my view as the corollary proposition that
the Federal Government must be held within the boundaries of its
own power when it intrudes upon matters reserved to the States.
20

We citizens enjoy the dual citizenship of state and nation, something necessary to maintain a respect for the republican origin of
the nation and preserve its federal character.
By our own declaration, then, "Our Federalism" is a grand innovation. But so also, of course, was the "New Coke" and the Edsel.
Why did we choose to use this radical innovation of government
structure, and have its results merited the praise we have lavished upon it?
At first blush, it hardly seems like the most efficient way to run
a railroad or a country. The Brazilian brand of federalism is oriented to the practical concerns of governing a huge and widely
diverse population over a land mass that would make complete
central control difficult at best. The America of 1787 would have
presented at least some of the same factual bases for the institution of a federal system as did Brazil, particularly in terms of religious diversity of population and a land mass that would make
central control difficult.
But America did not come to federalism from a priori state of
monarchy. We had state governments and a system trying to function under the Articles of Confederation. That system was creaking, however, and it became clear that something of a stronger
national government, one broader based, was necessary.
A national government with local offices in various regions
could have theoretically done the job of governing the nation with
efficiency and a degree of uniformity consistent with what some
may consider good business management techniques. However,
20. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 841. Even in dissent, Justice Thomas declared that
the overriding principle of our government is that "[a]ll power stems from the consent of the
people." Id. at 846. Where his analysis diverged, was that the consent of the people was, in
his view not given as the "consent of the undifferentiated people of the nation as a whole"
but as the consent of the people of each state, acting as a state. Id. at 846. He admonished
the majority to remember the warning of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316 (1819), that no political scientist or "dreamer" should ever engage in thoughts
so wild as "to think of breaking down the lines which separate the states, and of compounding the American people into one common mass." Id. at 849.
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we chose a federal system, in which that atom of sovereignty was
split and two governments were formed. Presumably, as in the
splitting of any atom, we would expect that a considerable degree
of energy we could harness for a positive use would occur. To
what end did we seek to put that energy?
IV. WHY WE CHOSE FEDERALISM
Overall, what we have consistently said about federalism in the
United States is that its principle function is the protection of individual liberty -- protection, that is, from the very government(s)
a federal system creates. This being its raison d'etre courts cannot
play the role of sideline observers to political negotiations involving the more active political players. They must play an active
role in enforcing federalism. Leaving federalism in the hands of
the legislatures and executive officials would be to entrust to those
who we fear may usurp the liberty we seek the protection of the
very device we have created to deter that usurpation.
What the evidence I will set forth below suggests is that the
American experience with federalism proceeded from an attempt
to delicately improve upon, but not reject, an a priori system in
which individual states existed, had considerable political authority, and enjoyed the popular support of at least their free citizens.
When an initial attempt to confederate those states proved unworkable, however, and it was clear that a central government
was needed to do more than the Articles of Confederation allowed,
the specter of the return of an American George III haunted the
calls for reform.
When the nation sat down to write the rules for its new national
government, fears of tyranny were palpable. The a priori system
had its flaws, but those flaws did not include rule by divine right.
So, while, on the one hand, it appeared necessary for those who
would create a new life form of a national government to set loose
on the world a more powerful creature, the lessons of Dr. Frankenstein (as much as those of John Locke) had to be recalled. In
constructing the beast, some internal mechanisms needed to be
installed to insure that at some point the beast did not turn
around and enslave its master.
The history of our political and judicial thinking on these subjects is replete with direct statements that separation of powers
and federalism were the two internal mechanisms built into the
newly created national government for this purpose. Far from being devices to improve that government's efficiency, they were
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meant to operate as checks upon it in the service of the preservation of the individual liberty of the people whose consent brought
that government about.
Madison's Federalist Paper #51 is the clearest articulation of
this principle in the literature at the time. Were we to be governed by angels, he observed, "neither external nor internal controuls on government would be necessary."'21 But angels almost
never run for public office. The stuff of government was all too
human and, thus, the creature under construction would have a
less than angelic nature. In creating the Frankenstein monster of
government to "controul the governed," then, it was necessary at
the same moment for the creators to oblige that monster to control
itself.22
Relying on the people who would be the government to restrain
themselves was never going to work. A plan with certain "auxiliary precautions" was necessary, and it was in federalism that one
of those precautions was to be found.
Madison's view was as follows:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each, is subdivided
among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to rights of the people. The different governments will controul each other; at the same time that each
23
will be controulled by itself.
Controlling governments by governments would operate in a
uniquely positive way in the American experiment to free the people from tyrants and, as Madison saw it, from each other. The
system created would not simply guard against the coming of the
despot, but it would guard "one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. '24 The breaking down of the American
political structure into many parts, even though each of those
parts would look to its legitimacy from the common source of the
body of the people, would deter an overarching majority from imposing their will on the rights of individuals or minority groups.
In this sense, federalism would embrace the notion of a pluralistic

21.

ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 203.

22. Id.
23. Id. 204-05.
24. Id. at 205.
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society. It would establish a system in which minorities would find
places to flourish and, by their healthy survival, stand as ready
deterrents to a tyrannical majority otherwise facilitated by its
ability to dominate a unitary system of government.
In the extended republic of the United States, and among the
great variety of interests, parties and sects which it embraces, a
coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place
on any other principles than those of justice and the general good;
and their being thus less danger to a minor from the will of the
major party, there must be less pretext also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not
dependent on the latter; or in other words, a will independent of
25
the society itself.
Federalism would invite diversity; diversity would promote the
idea that when consensus was achieved, it would be achieved only
on those matters upon which each individual and each group had,
26
at least at minimum, a level of political comfort.
The courts have consistently echoed Madison's view that the
fundamental benefit of federalism is not simply the achievement
of some interesting structural nuance which sets us apart from
other nations, but the protection of individual liberties. A selection of these opinions will make the point adequately.
In his dissenting opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Authority,27 Justice Powell bemoaned the majority's diminishment
of the importance of the Tenth Amendment as an action that
threatened to "substantially" alter "the federal system embodied
in the Constitution." 28 More specifically, he argued:
A unique feature of the United States is the federal system of
government guaranteed by the Constitution and implicit in the
very name of our country. Despite some genuflecting in the
Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, today's decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric
29
when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Reducing the Tenth Amendment was tantamount to ignoring
federalism, something he pegged as a structural guarantee of in25. Id. at 206.
26. ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 206. It is perhaps in the same spirit that Jay wrote in
Federalist #2 that the type of national government Awisely framed was one that would
appeal to those intelligent people who were no less attached to the union, than enamored of
liberty. Id. at 132.
27. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
28. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557 (Powell, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 560.
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dividual rights evident from the composition of the Constitution
itself.
Powell points out a feature of the Tenth Amendment that is
sometimes lost on the casual student, who considers it only in the
context of those sections of his or her Constitutional Law course
dealing with the always scintillating topics of congressional power
to tax, spend, and regulate commerce.
In fact, the Tenth Amendment is one of the Bill of Rights, the
nine preceding articles of which either delineate the ways in which
government may not intrude into our lives or remind the reader
that that delineation was not meant to be exhaustive. The Tenth
Amendment is an article wholly germane to the principle purpose
of the Bill of Rights. It was one of the provisions that was insisted
upon, as Justice Powell points out, by those whose vote for ratification of the Constitution hinged upon the obtaining of a guarantee that the national government would not become too powerful
and render civil liberties meaningless.3 0 Indeed, "eight states
voted for the Constitution only after proposing amendments to be
adopted after ratification,"' and each of those eight proposals included "a provision reserving powers to the States."32 The Tenth
Amendment thus plays an "integral role ... in our Constitutional
theory ,"a to wit:
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sovereignty
reserved to the States would ensure that the States would serve as
an effective 'counterpoise' to the power of the Federal Government. The States would serve this essential role because they
would attract and retain the loyalty of their citizens. The roots of
such loyalty, the Founders thought, were found in the objects peculiar to state government. 34
To disregard that separate sphere of sovereignty and to make
those objects not so peculiar to the state governments would, in
Powell's argument, result in problems that were "not simply a
35
matter of dollars and cents":
Rather, by usurping functions traditionally performed by the
States, federal overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the constitutionally mandated balance of power between

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 568.
Id. at 569.
Id.
Garcia,469 U.S. at 570 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 571.
Id. at 572.
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the States and the Federal Government, a balance designed to
36
protect ourfundamental liberties."
Powell's argument is that the Tenth Amendment seeks to do indirectly what the other articles of the Bill of Rights seek to do directly. All are meant to protect personal liberty, but the Tenth
achieves its level of protection not by drawing external boundaries
around government power but by internally crippling the government's ability to spread the wings of its authority over that province of human choices individuals reserve to themselves.
Justice O'Connor made the same point in non-Tenth Amendment terms in Gregory v. Ashcroft.37 There, she provided us with
perhaps the most concise listing of the advantages of federalism
that our political theory seeks to grant us.
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the
people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in
democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government more respon38
sive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.
But putting all of these benefits to one side, Justice O'Connor
recognizes that "the principle benefit of the federalist system is a
check on abuses of government power. '39 Quoting from Justice
Powell in his Garcia dissent, Justice O'Connor agrees that federalism, much like separation of powers, serves "to prevent the accumulation of excessive power [so as to] . . . reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse. ' 40 While she wonders whether the federalist sys-

tem "has been quite as successful in checking government abuse"
'41
as our founders promised, "there is no doubt about the design.
To provide Madison's "double security" to the rights of the people,
each of dual sovereigns must maintain political credibility since it
is "in the tension between federal and state power" that "lies the
promise of liberty."42
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
38. Gregory,501 U.S. at 458.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 459.
42. Id. at 459. Both the majority and the dissenters in New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992), agreed with this proposition. Again writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor quoted herself in the Gregoryopinion by simply noting that the benefits of federal
structure and the assertion that the Tenth Amendment sought to recognize them had been
"extensively cataloged elsewhere" and Justice White, dissenting in New York v. United
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Justice Scalia was explicit in Printz v. United States,43 when he
deemed "this separation of the two spheres" of governmental authority as "one of the Constitution's structural protections of liberty." 44 Echoing sentiments expressed in the New York case,
Scalia reiterated that federalism is institutionalized for the reasons most things are institutionalized -- to represent an ongoing
judgment about the proper way in which issues are to be decided
and difficult matters are to be resolved, so that in times that we
are tempted to concentrate power in one location to deal with the
exigency of the moment, we will find that the Constitution "pro45
tects us from our own best intentions."
Justice Thomas was similarly blunt in his assessment of the
need for federalism in Federal Maritime Commission v. South
Carolina State Ports Authority,46 where he observed that while
dual sovereignty is hardly "a model of administrative convenience," its purpose is surely otherwise. 47 Echoing the sentiments
of both the Gregoryopinion and Justice Powell's dissent in Garcia,
Justice Thomas held that an effort by the Court to guard against
"encroachments by the Federal Government on fundamental aspects of state sovereignty" is simply an effort to reduce the risk of
48
either government achieving the status of tyrant.
So, the federalist system may indeed portend a variety of collateral, good-government benefits, not the least of which is the encouragement of experimentation and innovation through the establishment of multiple governing crucibles scattered about the
nation. 49 But we did not choose federalism for efficiency's sake. We
chose it, first and foremost, as an act of sublime irony: we created
more governments than we seemed to need in order to limit the
governments we figured we needed to have. We needed to be governed, but we were paranoid about being oppressed.
States, agreed that "the entire structure of our federal Constitutional government can be
traced to an interest in establishing checks and balances to prevent the exercise of tyranny
against individuals." Id. at 206 (White, J., dissenting).
43. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
44.

Printz, 521 U.S. at 921.

45. Id. at 933.
46. 535 U.S. 743 (2003).
47. Id. at 769.
48. Id.
49. This notion is certainly envisioned by Justice O'Connor's rendering in Gregory v.
Ashcroft, supra at note 37, as well as notions reflected in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) and the majority opinion in Garcia, 468
U.S. at 546 (in which the Court indicates that the states may serve as Alaboratories for
social and economic experiment@).
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V. THE NECESSARY ROLE OF THE COURTS
If this true, if this is in fact the underlying theory of why we
chose federalism, it is not surprising that our courts are called
upon to play a much greater role in enforcing it than the courts of
the great nation of Brazil. One of those truths that are self evident is that if one is structuring a governmental system to try to
keep the main political players (the executive and legislature)
from invading that province of individual choices that individuals
have left for themselves, it will be necessary for some other branch
of government to be the effective tool of that enforcement. As we
have yet to dream up an effective fourth branch of government to
do the job, it is obvious that it is to the judiciary that the task
must fall to enforce those provisions of individual liberty which
our Bill of Rights both explicitly and implicitly seek to preserve.
Accordingly, while there has been some back and forth in the
Supreme Court on the essence of the notion, the Supreme Court
has now firmly established that it must take a proactive role in
enforcing the principles of federalism in the name of the protection
of individual liberties. Just as it cannot escape the demands of
provisions of the Bill of Rights that specify conduct protected from
governmental intrusion, the Court has concluded that the principles of federalism (whether in the form of the Tenth Amendment
or otherwise) equally compel it to provide protection for conduct
that the structure of our government also places outside the reach
of political entities.
Federalism has motivated the Court to act in a variety of contexts, as shown below.
Limiting Congress'Power Under the Commerce Clause

A.

While numerous cases could be discussed to illustrate the
Court's role in defining Congress' power under the commerce
clause, for purposes of this brief note, reference to Lopez v. United
50
States is all that is necessary.
In Lopez, the Supreme Court shocked a substantial portion of
the Federal Criminal Defense Bar and, perhaps, many others everywhere, by striking down a federal statute that made it a crime
to possess a gun in a school zone. Justice Rehnquist did not find
that some external passage in the Constitution (such as the Tenth

50.

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Amendment) constrained congressional power to reach this activity; rather, he found that the commerce clause itself was insufficient to support this Act.
Among the "first principles" he invoked to demonstrate this insufficiency was the understanding that the Constitution delegates
to the federal government powers that "are few and defined." 51 In
a theme borrowed from Gregory, this specific enumeration of a
limited number of delegated powers was a device that served the
goal of the protection of individual liberty.5 2 How this would operate to protect individual liberty was a matter at the heart of federalism. If the Court disregarded the principle that federal powers are few and defined, and continued its previous practice of allowing the expansion of commerce clause power by piling "inference upon inference" to support a connection between conduct
regulated and commerce, such a process "would bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the commerce clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the states. '53 Unchecked expansion of such power by inference would, in the Chief Justice's
view, force the Court ultimately to conclude that the Constitution's process of enumerating powers was a pointless exercise,
leaving what is truly national and what is truly local to nothing
more than the whim of Congress.
Someone within the system would have to forestall such a development in the name of the protection of individual liberty that
federalism promised. Justice Rehnquist announced that it was the
Court that would fulfill that role. Allowing the line between the
national and the local to be blurred was something "we are unwill54
ing to do."
Justice Kennedy, concurring in Lopez, made an even more forceful argument for the Court's intervention. While expressing the
view that the Court should not readily reject established commerce clause jurisprudence, 55 Kennedy cautioned that the Court
should not deem itself lacking in the authority and responsibility
56
"to review congressional attempts to alter the federal balance."
Federalism, he said, was a critical, significant structural feature of
the Constitutional system, one of importance equal to others like
51. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
52. Gregory,501 U.S. at 458.
53. Lopez 514 U.S. at 567 (Kennedy, J., Concurring).
54. Id. at 568.
55. Id. at 574.
56. Id. at 575.
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separation of powers, and, just as the Court developed ways to
enforce the other principles, Kennedy was confident that the
Court could effectively enforce federalism through its normal
57
processes.
It is in his concurrence that Kennedy extolled federalism as "the
unique contribution of the framers to political science and political
theory. 58 He found that federalism was a counter-intuitive concept, involving the notion that freedom of individuals was more
59
properly enhanced by "the creation of two governments, not one.
Those two governments afforded the individual more liberty as
long as there was a realization that two lines of "political accountability" exist for citizens, one to the federal government and one to
the states.6 0 To blur those lines of accountability, to render the
people unable truly to hold either house of their government answerable, is a circumstance, he believed, "more dangerous even
61
than devolving too much authority to the remote central power."
In the first instance, Kennedy believed that the political
branches of government have a distinct responsibility to ensure
that those lines of accountability are kept open. He felt it "axiomatic" that Congress has substantial discretion and control over
the system of federalism. Concurrent with that was the notion
that the political branches have "the sworn obligation to preserve
and protect the Constitution in maintaining the federal balance"
and adopt this as a most grave responsibility "if democratic liberty
62
and the federalism that secures it are to endure."
But, certainly, political branches cannot be entrusted fully with
the maintenance of their own borders of power. In the "absence of
structural mechanisms to require those officials to undertake this
principle task, and the momentary political convenience often attendant upon their failure to do so," there lies the necessity for the
Court to enforce the principles of federalism. 63 Federalism is simply "too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays
too vital a role in securing freedom" for the Court to wash its
hands of federalist concerns or to defer to the political branches
the issue of where the lines of federalism should be drawn. 64 The
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575.
Id. at 576.
Id.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 578-79.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578.
Id.
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Court's obligation to enforce this critical device for the protection
of individual liberties may be invoked reluctantly, but it must be
65
invoked nonetheless.
B.

Resurrectingthe Tenth Amendment

Having already analogized the structure of our government to
the monster of Dr. Frankenstein, the intelligent reader might suspect that I have exhausted the supply of horror movie references
allotted to me for one law review article. In this, the intelligent
reader would be wrong.
The Tenth Amendment is the vampire of the really great but
really bad sequels of our youth. Whether played by immortals (I
choose the term with specific intent) like Bella Lugosi or Christopher Lee, or by some lesser actor, great vampires and great vampire movies often had to come up with a device to allow the vampire to be resurrected after he had been killed at the end of the
first movie. No sequel would be otherwise possible and plausible to
those adept at suspending disbelief. The Tenth Amendment has
had a similar history of being buried and resurrected, not by
stakes through its heart or by being bathed in the light of day, but
by the vagaries of the Supreme Court's interpretation of it.
Within the last thirty years or so, it has been resurrected, buried, and resurrected once again. In all respects, the resurrection
and burial has been at the instance of a Court determined to define its own role with respect to enforcing the parameters of federalism.
In NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,6 6 Justice Rehnquist pulled
the wooden stake labeled "truism" from the Tenth Amendment's
heart that had been affixed there thirty-five years earlier by
65. Justice Souter's dissent in Lopez frames the counter argument regarding the
Court=s role in these matters. He recited the notion that [had been extant] up until Lopez
that when the Court reviewed congressional legislation under the commerce clause, it had
generally deferred to what was sometimes Aa merely implicit congressional judgment that
its regulation addresses a subject substantially affecting interstate commerce.@ Lopez, 514
U.S. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting). As long as that judgment appeared to be within some
reasonable boundary, the Court satisfied itself with simply determining whether the means
chosen to implement that finding were otherwise prohibited by a specific portion of the
Constitution. Id. Souter observed that for the 60 years prior to Lopez, the Court had never
assumed that Congress was attempting to alter the relationship between state and federal
governments and he argued [that as nothing] within the commerce clause mandated judicial activism and that Anothing about the judiciary as an institution made it a superior
source of policy on the subject Congress dealt with,@ there was not reason for the Court to
re-enter that arena now. Id. at 611.
66. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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United States v. Darby.67 While acknowledging that the Amendment may be but a statement of the obvious (that is, that power in
a society lies somewhere, with the federal government, the states,
or the people), it is a statement of enormous but less than obvious
68
significance.
The National League Court saw the Tenth Amendment as a vital, active shield, carving out a protected sphere of "attributes of
state sovereignty attaching to every state government which may
not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an
affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but
because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority
in that manner. ''69 The Court's approach here differed markedly
from its efforts in Lopez and cases of that ilk,70 where the Court
sought to define the nature of Congressional power without necessary reference to other parts of the Constitution. The National
League conception used the Tenth Amendment in a manner very
similar to the way in which other Amendments in the Bill of
Rights are utilized, that is, by recognizing that while Congress
may have power from a provision in the body of the Constitution
to do something, there are external limits on the reach of that
power (or the method by which it is implemented) that the people
have placed and want to be enforced. The Tenth Amendment did
not limit Congress by way of the specific method it chose, but it
did limit by way of the result achieved: if a quantum of state sovereignty necessary to the preservation of federalism was imperiled, the Court was bound to act.
Unfortunately for those who advocated this view, the means
adopted by National League and its progeny proved unworkable.
Indeed, it proved so unworkable that less than a decade later, the
Supreme Court took the vampire that is the Tenth Amendment
and cast it into the sunlight once more, reducing it to the hapless
state of truism in Garcia.
The Garcia majority challenged the fundamental maxim that
the courts were even capable of coming up with a conception of the
Tenth Amendment that was sensible and rationally enforceable as
a principle of federalism. Indeed, the majority ultimately con67. 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
68. NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 843.
69. Id. at 845.
70. See also, Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) and Jones v. United States,
529 U.S. 848 (2000) (additional cases in which the Court either stuck down or noted the
limits of Congressional power under the commerce clause).
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cluded that methodologies to limit the federal government's ability
to interfere with state functions would have to be found somewhere else beside the Tenth Amendment. 71
But it found no such ready principle in any other specific prohibition of the Constitution. And it proclaimed the hunt for one
pointless, since the thing to be protected, state sovereignty, was
an amorphous creature at best.
After all, state sovereignty was not, the Court held, a fixed and
definitive commodity which could be defined for all purposes and
all occasions. Rather, state sovereignty was a matter subject to
multiple qualifications and exceptions otherwise contained within
the Constitution, 72 and it constantly changed shape over time. It
was not that state integrity was not important; it was simply that
it emerged not from Constitutional fiat but from the ebb and flow
of federal politics itself. The device for preserving that integrity
was one not found in the exact contours of Constitutional limitations but rather "in the structure of the federal government itself,"
73
a procedural, not substantive protection.
Federalism was principally a device for structuring the political
landscape, one in which the states were protected by simply being
represented within the same federal government that was the
states' principle opponent in the fight for a finite quantum of political power. The Court saw the states as having "indirect influence over various branches of the federal executive and legislature
and, at least initially, a direct interest in the composition of the
United States Senate."74 This conception of federalism spoke very
little of the idea that the underlying purpose of the doctrine was
the protection of individual liberty and focused more on its structural features in the ordering and organization of government.
In short, the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in
which special restraints on federal power over the states inhered principally in the workings of the National Government
itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more
properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the

71. Garcia,469 U.S. at 547.
72. Id. at 551.
73. Id. at 550. It may be observed that this is a conception not dissimilar to Professor
Rosenn's idea that Brazilian federalism is the product of a complex negotiation among
political entities there.
74. Id. at 551.
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structure of the federal system than by judicially created limi75
tations on federal power.
Limitations on federal power were to be ones "of process rather
than one[s] of result," 76 with the Court essentially relegated to the
role of an interested observer of how the political system would
define its own contours.
While the Garcia majority placed a great deal of faith in the political system to self-correct, its faith was not complete. In a tantalizing paragraph towards the end of the opinion, the Court
equivocated somewhat by holding that the cases then before them
"do not require us to identify or define what affirmative limits the
constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting
The stake in the
the States under the Commerce Clause." 77
and the memfixed
heart of the Tenth Amendment was not firmly
bers of the majority seemed to anticipate that yet another sequel
was in production. They were right.
Only seven years after placing its faith in the political process to
preserve federalism, the Supreme Court got back into the business
of judicial enforcement of federalism in New York v. United
States.78 Recognizing that some of its most difficult questions lie in
the area of defining federal/state power, the Court nevertheless
felt fully competent in deciding such a question where the issue
was the federal government's attempt to require the states to legislate under the threat of federal sanction.
The Tenth Amendment re-appears here as a tautology, but
hardly a toothless one. The Court found that the Tenth Amendment "directs us to determine, as in this case, whether an incident
of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article 1
power."79 While acknowledging that the political framework of the
nation could remain flexible enough to permit significant changes
in the balance of governmental responsibilities, the Court nonetheless felt that the Tenth Amendment was a mandate for it to
draw specific lines between federal and state power to ensure that
state legislatures were neither commandeered nor rendered "mere
political subdivisions of the United States."80

75.
76.
77.

Id. at 552.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
Id. at 556.

78.

505 U.S. 144 (1992).

79.
80.

New York, 505 U.S. at 157.
Id. at 188.
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This principle also found voice in Printz v. United States,8 1
where the prohibition against commandeering was extended to
state executive officials. Per Justice Scalia, the Court explicitly
reasserted itself as a protector of liberties through a vigorous enforcement of the Tenth Amendment, an enforcement that the
Court deemed necessary to uphold one of the Constitution's two
structural protections of individual liberty. 82
Today, the vampire that is the Tenth Amendment is allve aId
well, a creature of power and significance, one that the Supreme
Court is not afraid to unleash on a Congress it feels has gone too
far.
C.

Enforcing Federalismfrom Both Ends: The Dormant Commerce Clause

An extended discussion of this multi-layered area of the law is
beyond the scope of this comment. Still, it is intriguing to note
that the Court has adopted for itself a role of enforcing federalism
not only by looking at Congress' power (either via its internal limits under the commerce clause or its external limits through the
Tenth Amendment), but also by charting the border between the
state and federal sovereignties from the perspective of the states.
The Court has deemed itself competent to find that there are
times when the states, through police power, have tread upon
ground reserved for federal legislation, and, even where the federal government has not affirmatively asserted its claim to that
ground, to banish the states from it.
The Court has developed a formulation for this inquiry that
permits it to strike down a state statute after assessing whether
the statute sought to regulate an area even handedly so as to effectuate a legitimate local interest, and where the effects of that
regulation on interstate commerce were, on balance, not found to
be clearly excessive in relation to the legitimate local interests and
otherwise could not reasonably be achieved through means that
83
would have a lesser impact on interstate commerce.
While some members of the Court would be happy to move away
from this multi-layered consideration to one that would be even
more favorable to the state's ability to legislate,8 4 consensus was
81.
82.
83.
84.
senting

521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Printz,521 U.S. at 922.
Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
See Camp Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (disopinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas).
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reached in 1976 on a profound development in the Supreme
Court's enforcement of federalism in this mode that gave the
states a freer hand to seize more of the unclaimed frontier of political power that lies at its border with the federal government.
The market participant exception, however, first announced in
8 5 has survived unlike the
Hughes v. Alexandra Scrap Corporation,
86
NationalLeague doctrine that was born in the same year.
In this area once more, the Court has not allowed the political
players to fix the frontiers of their authority by mere political
combat. The Court has asserted a Constitutional prerogative to
draw those lines even after the political dust has settled.
D.

The Ever-Elastic Eleventh Amendment

As Professor Rosenn points out, that Brazilian Constitution has
no parallel to our Eleventh Amendment.8 7 Our Eleventh Amendment, as written, has only a passing parallel to the current meaning of the Eleventh Amendment as it operates within our Courts.
While the superficial language of the Amendment would seem to
indicate that it recognizes sovereign immunity only in cases where
citizens of a foreign state have sued a state in federal court, the
doctrine has substantially expanded to provide for protections of
the state against suit by its own citizens in federal court, suits
using federal causes of action not grounded upon the Fourteenth
Amendment, and suits against the state in federal regulatory
88
agencies.
While exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity recognition are not insignificant,8 9 the protection offered
the states remains palpable. More to the point here, the Eleventh
Amendment has provided the Court with yet another forum from
which it may play the activist role it seeks to play in enforcing the
doctrine of federalism.

85. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
86. See, Reeves Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), White v. Massachusetts Council of
Construction Employers Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983), and South-Central Timber Development
82 (1984)(upholding the market participant exception but
Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S.
finding that the particular state action there was regulatory and not participatory).
87. See Rosenn, supra note 2 (manuscript at 10).
88. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); and Federal Maritime Commission v.
South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
89. See 1,TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 534-47 (3rd ed. 2000).
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A PROMISE OF LIBERTY
VI. EVALUATING FEDERALISM:
FULFILLED?
If, as I have tried to show, the Supreme Court identifies the protection of individual liberty as the great purpose of federalism,
and itself as the prime protector that has, in many different ways,
invalidated laws in the name of a federalist crusade, it is worth
asking the simple question: how is it all working? In other words,
what have we actually received from the device that promised us
liberty?
I suppose the easiest way to perform such an appraisal is to
consider the commodity the process is supposed to produce: individual freedom. But, as is often the case in the law (or, at least,
law school) questions beget questions. What sort of freedom were
we after when we picked federalism to achieve it? Freedom from
something or someone? Freedom to do something? Freedom is not
a one size fits all commodity, after all, and it behooves us to know
what we are looking for before we ask if federalism has effectively
produced it.
Perhaps speculating on what ways in which we wanted to be
free is pointless and we should content ourselves with the text of
the Constitution to provide the definitive list of freedoms we
wished to place on the highest pedestal of the law. Tragically, beyond a certain point, such a definitive list eludes us.
Conceptually, the first eight Amendments list certain specific
freedoms which the people wanted to take out of the political
game, conduct and processees we proclaimed could not become
bargaining chips in a political back and forth. Had we stopped
here, our assessment of federalism could begin in earnest. We
would be able to ask in what ways federalism allowed us more
freedom to worship, speak, carry guns, and avoid the ever annoying occurrence of soldiers being quartered in our homes, and, having created an effective bar graph of effectiveness, declare the federalism experiment a success or failure.
But, of course, our Bill of Rights is not a closed-ended document.
The Ninth Amendment, qualifying the purposes of the preceding
eight, reminds us that, while we bothered to list certain rights in
the first eight Amendments, we did not mean, by that act of listing, to imply that there was nothing else we wanted to have protected from governmental intrusion. There are more rights out
there, we proclaimed, and government must take care not to disparage them.
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Grafted onto this ominous but important bit of imprecision is
the Tenth Amendment. What sort of freedom is the Tenth
Amendment supposed to be protecting? Is it simply a back up
provision to the first nine, or does it protect something more or
different than the first nine tenths of the Bill of Rights to which it
is attached?
The primary text of our Constitution not only proves elusive in
guiding us as to what sort of freedom federalism sought to protect,
it is downright confounding. For some sense of clarity in this, we
need to take a brief flight outside the strict hallways of the law.
Philosophy beckons. 90
A.

A PossibleMethodology Seeing Freedom as a ThreeDimensional Object

As Professor MacCallum has written, an attempt by political
philosophers to characterize freedom as either negative (freedom
from restriction) or positive (freedom to pursue aspirations) is a
failed and ineffectual way of understanding its essential feacalls the
tures. 91 Indeed, he advises us against asking what he
92
free."
men
are
when
of
question
unadorned
and
"dreary
Men are never simply free MacCallum argues, and trying to
think of freedom just as the absence of restraint or as general liberation to engage in a broader range of human conduct fails to
provide a unified analysis that the true nature of freedom demands. This unified analysis is formed in what he calls the triadic
relation of variables that must be accounted for in every discussion of freedom. MacCallum's triadic forms the question of freedom in the following terms.
First, freedom is always freedom of an agent, that is, some person or group deemed to be the party whose level of freedom we will
measure. Secondly, freedom is from something, that is, some impediment that is placed upon the agent. The third element of the
triadic formula is that freedom allows the agent who otherwise
faces the impediment to do something, that is, either perform
some action or achieve a state of character. MacCallum's triadic
90. I am deeply indebted to my son, Christian Antkowiak, for his insight and research
assistance in this portion of the article. His studies of political theory at Oxford and other
venues have equipped him well to this purpose, as they will enhance his forthcoming studies of law.

91. Gerald C. MacCallum, Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 CORNELL PHIL. REV. 3,
312-34 (1967).
92. Id. at 327.
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formula translates into the question of whether "X is (is not) free
93
from Y to do (not do become, not become) Z."

MacCallum's advice to us on how we should evaluate the notion
that federalism makes us free would be to consider the following:
Only when we determine what the men in question are free
from, and what they are free to do or become, will we be in a
position to estimate the value for human happiness and fulfillment of being free from that (whatever it is) to do the other
thing (whatever it is). Only then will we be in a position to
make rational evaluations of the relative merits of societies
94
with regard to freedom.
Applying MacCallum's triadic formula to the Constitution produces interesting results. While it is fairly easy to look at the
First Amendment and say that it, in part, relates that persons
within the jurisdictionof the United States are to be free from government interference in the practice of their religion, the equation
has much more interesting consequences when we pass from the
First Amendment to the Tenth.
While the agent may be the same in this formulation, the nature of the impediment must change from government generally to
the federal government more specifically. The really interesting
problem, however, concerns the third part of the equation in terms
of what action or state of character those agents are now free to do
because of federalism. Does the Tenth Amendment operate simply
to protect the freedoms specifically identified in the first eight
Amendments? Does it only seek to protect the other specific freedoms which are referenced in but not identified by the Ninth
Amendment? Or, does the Tenth Amendment deal with something else entirely, not a delineation or specification of identifiable
"freedoms" at all? Does federalism have the important but less
ambitious goal of securing nothing specifically but everything generally, that is, protecting us not from any particular deprivation of
liberty but from the creation of a power broadly capable of that
deprivation? Is the triadic equation of federalism that persons
within the jurisdictionof the United States are free from the uncer-

tainty and fear attendant to living under the arbitraryrule of a
trant?

93.
94.

Id. at 314-20.
Id. at 329.
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MacCallum's thesis helps frame the question of the proper definition of freedom in federalism terms. Professor Pettit's teachings
may lead us to answer that question in the affirmative.
B.

Federalismand Antipower

In his seminal article on the concept of freedom, "Freedom as
Antipower," Professor Phillip Pettit describes a kind of freedom
95
that may be the objective our federalism seeks to achieve.
Pettit argues that the modern conception of freedom is freedom
from the actual influence of an outside force on our capacity to
make choices about the course of our lives. 96 The traditional notion
of liberty, one he argues was extant in the writings of the American Revolutionaries, however, was something slightly, but importantly, different.
Pettit argues that the original idea of liberty was one bound up
in the notion that whether or not one's freedom was actually being
interfered with at the time, true freedom lies in a system in which
one was not at the mercy of another's arbitrary capacity to influence the critical decisions of his or her life at any time. It is this
conception of freedom that he calls "Antipower."
Under the conception of freedom as antipower, I am free to
the degree that no human being has the power to interfere
with me; to the extent that no one else is my master, even if I
lack the will or wisdom required for achieving self-mastery.
The account is negative in leaving my own achievements out
of the picture and focusing on eliminating a danger from others.

97

In an Antipower conception of liberty, the focus is "not just on
the actual interference that [others] perpetrate;" it is, rather, on
their capacity to do so in a system that leaves the individual pow98
erless to resist the arbitrary imposition of the outside will.
Pettit defines subjugation or domination as occurring where a)
the dominating agent (either a collective entity or another person)
has actual capacity to interfere, b) has the capacity to interfere
with impunity and at will, and c) has such capacity in regard to
95. Philip Pettit, Freedom as Antipower, 106 ETHICS No. 3, 576-604 (The University of
Chicago Press, 1996)[hereinafter Freedom as Antipoweri.
96. Id. at 576.
97. Id. at 578.
98. Id.
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certain choices that the other person is otherwise in a position to
make. 99 The actual capacity to interfere may arise from the threat
of punishment or other physical force and is typified by an attempt to worsen the situation of choice that the agent would otherwise enjoy. It can occur by either limiting the range of options
that the agent may otherwise choose or by changing the outcomes
or payoffs that the agent can hope to achieve by making those
choices. Pettit describes this capacity to act with impunity and at
will as one which occurs where the dominating party can act without penalty and the dominated person can neither assert himself
individually in response nor petition a central body to punish the
interferences that might occur.' 0 0
The converse of his view is also enlightening. For Pettit, evidence that one person (or a collective entity) has interfered with
another is not proof of domination at all. Rather, interference can
occur under a Constitutional authority that does not carry with it
the features of arbitrary and at will imposition that are typical of
the state of subjugation. 10 It is, however, when the power of such
imposition exists that people are not free and Pettit addresses how
it is that our society may structure itself so is to avoid that circumstance of oppression.
Petit argues that the elimination of subjugation and the institution of a system of antipower cannot be achieved simply by distributing arbitrary power among various groups.' 0 2 To defeat the
conditions under which people are subjugated, he believes that
03
persons must be able to command non-interference from others.'
This could be accomplished by taking from the powerful the resources they have to wield their power or by giving to the weak
additional resources to balance the power equation. A third way,
that which he advocates to be the most effective is to consider the
introduction of protective, regulatory, and empowering institutions. I do not say that every institution will necessarily increase
antipower, of course; some may have indirect, counter production
effects, and empirical work will be required to determine which
mix of institutions does best. I say only that protective, regulatory, and empowering institutions represent the sorts of options

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Freedom as Antipower, supra note 96 at 579-580.
Id. at 585-86.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 589.

Summer 2005 Contemplating Brazilian Federalism

625

that we ought to be considering if we are interested in the promo10 4
tion of antipower in a society.
These "protective institutions" represent for Pettit "the most salient possibility" to promote antipower and reduce the institutions
of subjugation he believes are the antithesis of liberty. These institutions "will serve to reduce the exposure of minorities to majority will;" they will operate with a goal of the protection of individual liberty.
The protection of the individual is mainly ensured in our society
by the institutions of a non-threatening defense system and nonvolunteeristic rule of law. The non-volunteeristic regimen of law a common law dispensation or a Constitutionally governed one will involve law that cannot be changed in certain respects at the
will of any majority, even a parliamentary majority; in this way it
10 5
will serve to reduce the exposure of minorities to majority will.
Pettit seems to be referring directly (if not indirectly) to the notion of federalism. Indeed, he argues that the American colonists
saw freedom as antipower, believing that the British government,
however benign a dictatorship it may have been, was a dictatorship nonetheless; the solution for such a dictatorship was to make
government subject "to proper, Constitutional control; the sort of
10 6
control that guards against arbitrary power."
Freedom as antipower . . .requires a specific sort of law and
polity in which the powers that be are denied possibilities of
arbitrary interference, and if it is to be a universally enjoyed
ideal, it requires a tension to the patterns of domination asso10 7
ciated with such context as marriage and workplace.
If Pettit is right that the Framers shared his conception of the
meaning of freedom as antipower, then we should be satisfied to
know that the system of federalism is working if it operates to give
the individual the chance to assert a challenge to governmental
authority that will have a realistic chance of success. That chance
will be determined by something other than the whim of the authority so challenged, and be susceptible of enforcement against
that central authority by an entity with sufficient authority to
balance the power relationship between the individual and the

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 590.
Freedom asAntipower,supra note 96 at 590.
Id. at 600.
Id. at 602.
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government. That chance, in terms of federalism in America, requires an activist court that will, on occasion, sustain attacks on
statutes by citizens invoking various devices like the Tenth
Amendment, the dormant commerce clause, and the others we
have previously discussed.
Indeed, Pettit argues that a way in which antipower can be realized in a society is if it is promoted by measures that have been
devised for the very purpose of limiting the resources of those in
power to wield arbitrary authority and, conversely, to give to the
otherwise powerless the opportunity to invoke effective challenge
against their rulers. These devices are the "rule of law constraints
that guard against legislative oppression, for example, and by requirements of regular election, democratic discussion, limitation of
tenure, rotation of office, separation of powers, availability of apHe
peal and review, provision of information, and the like." 0 8
Suthe
mechanisms
of
the
all
and
federalism
added
have
could
preme Court has fashioned to enforce it. He could have quoted
Justice Kennedy in Lopez and pointed out that in these ways the
people would be able to keep open and clear the lines of political
accountability necessary to their freedom. 10 9
If this is the kind of freedom the Framers wanted to achieve by
federalism, then the simplest way to evaluate whether federalism
is working is not to look for indications of how free we are individually, but how far our government is from the paradigm of an
arbitrary and tyrannical force. Federalism frees us by destabilizing government in the sense that it does not permit a ready gathering of political power into one neat, but fearful, place.
C.

EvaluatingFederalism:ExpectingMore Than a Promise of
Liberty

But is this destabilization enough of a result to warrant the reverential intonations we whisper when we speak of federalism?
Should we be expecting more for our investment than just a dose
of antipower? Much mischief can be visited upon an innocent person in a system in which antipower is the order of the day. If we
want more than just this kind of freedom, if we want ours to be a
just society, we may need to evaluate federalism in far different
terms than our Framers perhaps intended for it.

108.
109.

Id. at 591.
See, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-77.
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I have no intention to ask the question of what justice is. I will,
for a brief moment, adopt the John Rawls conception of justice as
fairness, and consider its two fundamental principles in terms of
whether federalism is, by itself, enough of a device to achieve it.
For Rawls, a society that has achieved justice as fairness operates under two principles. First, each person has an equal right to
the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all,
meaning that there exists a system of fundamental freedoms that
is capable of being shared and enjoyed by all in the society. 110 The
second principle is that where social or economic inequalities exist, they must exist so as to inure to the greatest benefit of the
least advantaged, with all persons in society having a fair and
equal opportunity to obtain the offices and positions which are
weighted to that end."'
Federalism itself does not enforce an overall series of individual
liberties to be shared equally by all and certainly does require the
distribution of the limited resources of society in a way that inures
to the benefit of the least advantaged. Perhaps asking for federalism to produce a just society in Rawl's terms is asking too much of
it.
But its utility in achieving those terms can be gleaned. Even if
it serves only to negate the creation of a state of subjugation, that
is, even if it creates no more (but no less) than Pettit's state of Antipower, it will form the necessary underpinnings of a condition
making the realization of Rawl's first principle possible.
As to Rawl's second principle, the feature of federalism that
could best advance the channeling of social/economic inequalities
to the aid of those most in need is its promotion of the idea of government as laboratory. Federalism allows diverse government
bodies to experiment in the distribution of scare resources with a
hoped for result that the best balances of such distribution will be
seen and copied throughout government in a way fostering our
overall advancement towards a just state.
Federalism, then, can facilitate justice as it does its bit to preserve the concept of freedom it is so centrally structured to insure.

110. John Rawls, Justice As Fairness,54 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY No. 22, 653
(October 24, 1957).
111. Id. at 653-54. See also, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, in Samuel Gorovitz,
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS 272-85 (Samuel Gorovitz ed., 1975).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In any event, the effort to ponder these questions is important.
We must give federalism its due since, after all, it is what the
Constitution prescribes. To know why we chose it, and what we
expect from it, must help guide how we enforce it and whether we
should one day consider scrapping it.
This may all seem like a far departure from Brazilian Federalism, but it is not. It is just what we should see when we look into
the mirror Professor Rosenn has held up for us. We should thank
him most sincerely.

